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SECURITIES FRAUD-THIRD CIRCUIT ADOPTS FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET
THEORY OF CAUSATION IN lOb-5 ACTIONS
Peil v. Speiser (1986)
Congress enacted section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) 1 to prevent all deceptive and manipulative prac-
tices in connection with securities trading.2 The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) subsequently promulgated rule 10b-5 to
protect sellers as well as buyers from a wide variety of fraudulent activ-
ity.3 Traditionally, a plaintiff in a private action under rule lOb-5 had to
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)
(complete codification of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1934) (purpose is to pro-
vide fair and honest markets to investors by banning all manipulative practices);
see also Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule
lOb-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 630-31 (1982).
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
3. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804-05 (1942). In
1942 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated rule lOb-5
pursuant to the authority granted in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 2. Rule lOb-5
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
Since the promulgation of the rule, the courts have held that rule lob-5
prohibits a broad range of fraudulent activities. See Note, supra note 2, at 631
n.24. The courts have also inferred a private cause of action under rule lOb-5.
See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971). Traditionally, a lOb-5 plaintiff had to prove "the scienter of the
defendant, the materiality of any misrepresentation or omission by the defend-
(913)
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prove actual reliance to show causation. 4 The Ninth Circuit, however,
stated in Blackie v. Barrack 5 that the requirement of showing direct reli-
ant .... actual reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant's statements, and the
justifiability of the reliance." Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th
Cir.)(footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). For a further explana-
tion of the 1Ob-5 plaintiff's traditional burden of proof, see List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.)(requiring that misrepresentation be material
and that reliance be placed thereon), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
For cases discussing the individual elements of a rule lob-5 action, see
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 passim (1976)(scienter); McGrath v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 466 (7th Cir.)(materiality), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 835 (1981); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695 (10th Cir. 1976)(en
banc)(reliance), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974)(causation), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975).
4. See 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 8.7, at 213 (1979); Note, The
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1982); see also Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976)(in some instances reli-
ance is element of plaintiff's action for damages under rule lOb-5). It is an ax-
iom of tort law that reliance provides the "causal nexus" between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury. Note, supra, at 1144 (citing W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 714 (4th ed. 1971)).
Section 10 of the Exchange Act was modeled after, and retained, many of
the characteristics of the common-law tort action of deceit. See 3 L. Loss, SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 1430-31 (1961). To prevail in such a deceit action, a
plaintiff bad to establish six elements: (1) a false representation of (2) a material
(3) fact; (4) defendant's knowledge of its falsity and his intention that plaintiff
rely on it; (5) the plaintiff's reasonable reliance thereon; and (6) his resultant
loss. Id. at 1431.
Consequently, the causation rationale in private lob-5 actions derives from
the classic tort doctrines of misrepresentation and deceit:
The false representation must have played a material and substantial
part in leading the plaintiff to adopt his particular course; and when he
was unaware of it at the time that he acted, or it is clear that he was not
in any way influenced by it, and would have done the same thing with-
out it for other reasons, his loss is not attributed to the defendant.
Note, supra, at 1144 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 108, at 714 (4th Ed. 1971)(footnotes omitted)). However, because the tradi-
tional face-to-face transactions regulated by the common law are distinguishable
from securities trading in anonymous, national markets, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the "common-law model" is of limited utility in lOb-5 actions.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975); see also
Note, supra at 1144 n.3.
5. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). The
Blackie court was the first circuit court to embrace a generalized fraud-on-the-
market theory. Note, supra note 4, at 1148. The facts in Blackie centered around
the financial difficulties of Ampex Corporation. 524 F.2d at 894. After report-
ing a profit in 1970, the company, by January, 1972, was predicting an estimated
$40 million loss for fiscal 1972. Id. The company's annual report for fiscal 1972
stated a loss of $90 million, and the company's independent auditors withdrew
certification of the 1971 financial statements and declined to certify those for
1972 because of doubts that the loss reported for 1972 was in fact suffered in
that year. Id. Several suits followed the corporation's disclosure of its 1972
losses. Id. The plaintiffs in the consolidated action on appeal were purchasers
of Ampex securities during the 27-month period between the release of the
1970 and 1972 annual reports. Id. The defendants included the corporation, its
914 [Vol. 32: p. 913
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ance "imposes an unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden" in
certain situations.6 Following the lead of Blackie, several courts have
done away with the requirement of direct reliance and demand only
proof of "fraud on the market"-fraudulent actions by a defendant that
affect the market price of stock which, in turn, induces the plaintiff to
purchase the stock. 7 In other words, some courts, in the absence of
principle officers during that period and the company's independent auditor. Id.
The gravamen of the claims was the misrepresentation by reason of annual and
interim reports, press releases and SEC filings from the date of the 1970 report
until the true condition was disclosed by the announcement of losses after the
1972 fiscal year. Id.
The Ninth Circuit held that "proof of subjective reliance on particular mis-
representation is unnecessary to establish a 10b-5 claim for a deception inflating
the price of stock traded in the open market." Id. at 906. The court noted that
causation is adequately established in the impersonal market context by proof of
purchase and of the materiality of mispresentations. Id. "Materiality circum-
stantially establishes the reliance of some market traders," the court stated, "and
hence the inflation in the stock price-when the purchase is made the causa-
tional chain between defendent's conduct and plaintiff's loss is sufficiently estab-
ished to make out a prima facie case." Id. (citing In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61
F.R.D. 88, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions
Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 593 (1975)).
6. 524 F.2d at 907. According to the Blackie court, this burden is unreason-
able because a purchaser on the stock exchanges may either be unaware of a
specific false representation or may not directly rely on it, purchasing instead for
some other reason, such as a favorable earnings trend or price-earnings ratio.
Id. The purchaser, however, relies generally on the assumption that the market
price is validly set and that no unknown manipulation has artificially inflated the
stock price. Id. Thus, the purchaser relies indirectly on the truth of the repre-
sentations underlying the stock price. Id. Whether or not he is aware of it, the
purchaser pays a price that reflects material misrepresentations. Id.; see also
Note, supra note 2, at 628-29 (rule lOb-5 plaintiffs face serious evidentiary bur-
den in proving subjective reliance on defendants' conduct in open-market
transactions).
Blackie and its progeny represent a significant departure from the traditional
burden of proof in private 1Ob-5 actions. Note, supra note 4, at 1143. For fur-
ther discussion of the traditional burden of proof, see supra note 3.
Courts have also noted the difficulty of proving subjective, individual reli-
ance in the context of class actions in securities fraud litigation. See In re Memo-
rex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973). There, the court pointed out the
"overwhelming task" of examining the subjective intent of each class member in
his decision with respect to his stock. Id. at 100. The court further stated that
"it appears that reliance of the actual, subjective, individual nature necessary in
the classical fraud case would unnecessarily encumber large lOb-5 actions and
thereby thwart the Congressional interest in providing a means by which inves-
tors may recover against market manipulators in federal court." Id. at 99.
7. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906-07. The fraud-on-the-market theory has been
accepted in some form by the Second, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.
See, e.g., Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11 th Cir. 1984) (theory is
properly applied in class action alleging defendant's manipulations inflated open
market price), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort
Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983)(applying the-
ory to new issue of bonds), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Panzirer v. Wolf,
663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981)(plaintiff's reliance on integrity of market in produc-
ing report in newspaper is merely extension of Blackie), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
3
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Supreme Court attention to the issue, have allowed indirect reliance on
the integrity of the securities market to substitute for direct reliance on
the defendant or the defendant's conduct. 8 In Peil v. Speiser,9 the United
1107, vacated as moot sub noma. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027
(1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981)(en banc)(applying
theory to purchase of newly issued stock), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983);
Blackie, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
The phrase "fraud on the market" actually originated in Herbst v. Able, 47
F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Herbst was an action on behalf of all persons who
converted certain debentures of the Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc. (Douglas)
into common stock of that company during a three-week period in 1966. Id. at
14. The plaintiffs alleged that false and misleading statements made by the de-
fendants had artificially inflated the value of Douglas securities and induced
them to convert their debentures into common stock. Id. at 16. Although the
case focused on the issue of class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and not on the application of the fraud-on-the-market
theory, the Herbst court noted that if the plaintiffs could prevail in their "fraud
on the market" theory, there might be sufficient grounds to sustain recovery
under section 10(b), given its "broad anti-fraud provisions" that extend beyond
the common-law actions for fraud and deceit. Id.
In general, courts look for the following three elements in the fraud-on-the-
market complaint: "(1) the misrepresentations have affected the price of the
firm's security; (2) the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the integrity of the market
price when trading in the security; and (3) when the firm's true situation came to
light, the price of the security reacted adversely." Note, The Fraud on the Market
Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an Implied 1 Ob-5 Action, 70 IOWA L. REV.
975, 977 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Fraud on the Market]; see also Lipton v. Docu-
matation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 741-42 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132
(1985); Blackie, 524 F.2d at 894.
The theory has received increasing attention from commentators. See Black,
Fraud on the Market. A Criticism of Dispensing With Reliance Requirements in Certain
Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435 (1984); Brunelle, The Shores Case-
Expansion of the "Fraud on the Market" Doctrine, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 390 (1982);
Ratner, Recent Developments in Litigation Under the Anti-Fraud Provisions: Materiality,
Reliance and Causation, and Corporate Mismanagement, 1979 TENTH ANN. INST. ON
SEC. REG. 445, 449-51; Note, The Future of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions
Under SEC Rule lOb-5: A Proposal, 9 CUMB. L. REV. 721, 737-39 (1979); Note,
supra note 2; Note, supra note 4; Note, supra note 5, at 592-96; Note, Fraud on the
Market Theory, supra, at 975.
8. Note, supra note 4, at 1146. Central to the fraud-on-the-market theory is
the premise that securities markets are efficient and that market prices respond
to information disseminated (or not disseminated) concerning the companies
whose securities are traded. Id. at 1154. In an efficient market, securities prices
reflect all available information, according to certain analysts and commentators.
See, e.g., Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTSJ. Sept.-Oct.
1965, at 55, 56, excerpted in R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION
LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 156, 157-58 (1980). This hypothesis is re-
ferred to as the efficient market hypothesis, theory or thesis. Note, Fraud on the
Market Theory, supra note 7, at 979. For a discussion of the SEC's acceptance of
the efficient-market thesis, as indicated by its adoption of an integrated disclo-
sure system, see Black, supra note 7, at 468-72.
A number of courts have recognized the efficient market hypothesis. See,
e.g., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361-62 (2d
Cir. 1979); In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 n.6 (D. Del.
1982); Fausett v. American Resources Mgmt. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (D.
Utah 1982); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143-45 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
916 [Vol. 32: p. 913
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit joined the growing
number of circuits that have adopted the fraud-on-the-market concept
and expressly held the theory applicable to rule lOb-5 claims in general
and rule lOb-5(b) claims in particular, in the context of a securities fraud
action by purchasers of corporate stock in an open and developed mar-
ket against corporate personnel who affirmatively misrepresented cor-
porate information. 10
The plaintiff in Speiser sued on behalf of a class of individuals who
For commentary and background on the efficient market hypothesis, see E.
FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 133-68 (1976); J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE
STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 98 (1973); Fama, Efficient Capital Mar-
kets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25J. FIN. 383 (1970); Fischel, Efficient
Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978); Pickholz & Horahan, The SEC's Vlersion of
the Efficient Market Theory and its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 943 (1982); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory
and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977).
The issues raised by Blackie and its progeny arose in the context of "large,
impersonal, actively traded markets," which might be termed "developed mar-
kets." Note, supra note 4, at 1154. In this setting, the reliance of some traders
upon material misrepresentations by issuers of securities influences market
prices and thereby affects even those traders who have never read or heard of
the deception. Id.; see also In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 145 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
Importantly, the presumption that the market price of stock reacts to and
reflects the available information may not be plausible in the case of undevel-
oped markets, such as the market for newly issued stock. Black, supra note 7, at
472-73; Note, supra note 4, at 1156-58. Because most empirical studies of effi-
cient markets have taken place in developed markets, it is not clear whether the
efficent-market hypothesis can be used to support the application of the fraud-
on-the-market theory to undeveloped markets such as those for new offerings
and restricted resale securities or to thin markets. Note, surpa note 4, at 1157.
For a further discussion of the limitation of the fraud-on-the-market theory to
developed markets, see infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
Two other assumptions on which the fraud-on-the-market theory arguably
rests are that the average investor does not need access to all available informa-
tion to make sound investment decisions and that damages due to misrepresen-
tation can be quantified. Note, Fraud on the Market Theory, supra note 7, at 978-79.
Some writers have argued that acceptance of these two assumptions and the effi-
cient market hypothesis makes the traditional 1Ob-5 defenses of nonreliance and
immateriality inappropriate in the fraud-on-the-market action. Id. at 979 (citing
Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW 1, 13 (1982)).
9. 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986). Circuit Judges Seitz, Higginbotham and
Becker heard the case. Id. at 1156. Judge Becker authored the opinion. Id.
Because he disagreed with the views set out in Part IV of the opinion, regarding
the preclusive effect of the jury verdict, Judge Becker drafted a separate dissent-
ing statement on that specific issue. See id. at 1156 n.l & 1167-68 (Becker, J.,
dissenting). Judge Seitz did not join in part III of the opinion. Id. at 1156 n.2.
Although he assumed that the fraud-on-the-market theory applied to 10b-5(b)
claims,Judge Seitz declined to reach that question, believing it was unnecessary
given the court's holding in part IV of the opinion. Id.
10. 806 F.2d at 1162-63. For a further discussion of the court's holding,
see inr!a notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
5
Fleming: Securities Fraud - Third Circuit Adopts Fraud-on-the-Market Theor
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
had purchased corporate stock from defendant Health-Chem Corpora-
tion during a seventeen-month period and later sold the stock at a
loss.' ! The individual defendants were officers of Health-Chem.
!2
Plaintiff, Raymond K. Peil, purchased 500 shares of Health-Chem's
stock on December 5, 1980, in the midst of a surge in the stock's price
due to favorable publicity surrounding Health-Chem's development of
technology designed to combat gypsy moths. 13 After the price of the
stock declined, Peil sold his shares for a loss in excess of $6,000. Other
members of the plaintiff class sustained similar losses.14
Peil brought a class action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Health-Chem Corporation and
its officers and directors alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act and section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, in addition to
11. 806 F.2d at 1156-57. Specifically, the plaintiff class consisted of individ-
uals who had purchased Health-Chem's stock between April 15, 1980 and No-
vember 2, 1981. Id. at 1157. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania certified the class on March 9, 1983, finding that thejoinder of all mem-
bers was impracticable, common questions were presented in the action; claims
of the representative party were typical of claims of the class; the representative
would fairly and adequately protect the interests of class; questions of law or fact
common to members of the class predominated over any questions affecting
only individual members; and the class action was a superior method of adjudi-
cation. Peil v. Speiser, 97 F.R.D. 657, 658-62 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
12. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1156-57. The individual defendants included: Mar-
vin Speiser, chairman of the board and president; Roy Marcus, senior vice-presi-
dent; Leon C. Baker, a member of Health-Chem's executive committee; and
Agis Kydonieus, executive vice-president of Health-Chem's Hercon Division. Id.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., the investment banking firm that had underwrit-
ten an April 15, 1981, offering of Health-Chem convertible debentures, was
named as a defendant in connection with plaintiffs' claim under section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 1157; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982). For a discus-
sion of the section 11 claim, see infra note 15.
Health-Chem was a diverse company engaged in several lines of business at
the time of the transaction, including the development of technology that would
permit the regulated release of chemicals through plastic membranes. Id. at
1156.
13. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1157. For a discussion of the circumstances under
which Peil purchased the stock, see infra note 18. During the late 1970s, Health-
Chem developed technology designed to combat gypsy moths with the aid of a
chemical called pheromone. Id. at 1157. The gypsy moth is a brownish or white
European moth, now common in the Eastern United States, whose larvae feed
on leaves and do great damage to trees and plants. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 648 (College ed. 1960). Pheromone is an aphrodisiac that female
insects release during the mating season. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1157 n.4. Health-
Chem developed pheromone spraying technology as well as a gypsy moth trap
for individual home owners to be used in combatting gypsy moth infestation of
trees. Id. As gypsy moth defoliation became a matter of great concern in 1980
and 198 1, Health-Chem's work attracted the attention of security analysts, news-
papers, scientific journals and gardening journals. Id. at 1157. The price of
Health-Chem's stock increased substantially during the latter half of 1980 and
early 1981, but subsequently declined. Id.
14. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1157.
[Vol. 32: p. 913
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss3/12
1987] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 919
various common-law offenses.' 5 Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that de-
fendants' false and misleading statements about Health-Chem's busi-
ness prospects had artificially inflated the price of Health Chem's stock,
and that the price of the stock induced plaintiffs to purchase it.16
Following certification of a class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), the case proceeded through a five-week jury trial.17
After plaintiffs presented their evidence,' 8 the district court granted a
15. Id. For the texts of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see supra notes 2-3. With
respect to their rule 10b-5 claim, plaintiffs alleged that Health-Chem and its di-
rectors and officers had violated clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that rule. Speiser, 806
F.2d at 1157.
Peil also claimed that Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., had violated § 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982)). The § 11 claim
concerned alleged inaccuracies in the registration statement and prospectus of
an April 15, 1981, issuance by Health-Chem of convertible debentures. Id. at
1159 n.8. Section 11 imposes civil liability for false registration statements. 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
Section 11 provides in pertinent part:
In case any part of the registration statement . . . [which] con-
tained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a mate-
rial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such secur-
ity ... may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent juris-
diction, sue
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
Id.
16. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1157. Plaintiffs further alleged that they had in-
curred financial losses when the falsity of defendant's representations became
apparent and the price of Health-Chem's stock fell to its true value. Id.
17. Id. at 1157. During the trial, plaintiffs presented 29 witnesses and 200
exhibits. Id. They sought to establish that the Health-Chem defendants knew
that the pheromone was not likely to be effective and that they had intentionally
disseminated false and misleading information in order to increase the value of
Health-Chem's stock. Id. Additionally, plaintiffs sought to prove the following:
1) that as a result of the misrepresentations and material omissions,
Health-Chem's stock was very heavily traded and was a leading percent-
age gainer on the American Stock Exchange in 1980; 2) that the pher-
omone never lived up to its billing and was eventually abandoned by
Health-Chem; and 3) that plaintiffs suffered losses as a result of their
purchase of Health-Chem's stock.
Id. at 1157-58; see also id. at n.6 (summary of plaintiff's evidentiary presentation
at trial).
Conversely, defendants argued at trial that their statements and financial
figures were accurate and their predictions were reasonable. Id. Further, de-
fendants argued that plaintiff Peil had not relied on the alleged misrepresenta-
tions. Id.
18. Id. at 1158. The court of appeals noted that the most significant testi-
mony was Peil's own. Id. Peil testified that he had purchased Health-Chem
stock based on the recommendation of his broker, who had advised him of an
article in Financial World magazine which predicted a large increase in the value
of the stock. Id. According to plaintiffs, the article included false representa-
tions by individual defendants about the company's outstanding prospects. Id.
At trial, Peil conceded that he had never read the magazine article and that,
7
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directed verdict for defendants on the common-law claims and the rule
lOb-5(b) claim, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to prove reliance. 19
Although the district court decertified the class with respect to the rule
lOb-5(b) and common-law claims, it denied defendants' motion for a
directed verdict with respect to the rule lOb-5(a) and (c) claims. 20 The
court stated that "direct" reliance by the plaintiffs on defendants' mis-
representations was not an essential element of those claims and that
defendants could be found liable if they committed a fraud on the
market.2 1
The district court then submitted plaintiffs' rule lOb-5(a) and (c)
and section 11 claims to the jury by special interrogatories. 22 Based
upon the jury's responses to the special interrogatories and the court's
prior rulings on defendants' motions for directed verdicts, the district
court entered judgment for defendants on all claims. 23 After plaintiffs
unsuccessfully moved for judgment n.o.v. on the section 11 claim, the
court entered judgment on the verdicts and plaintiffs appealed. 24
apart from his broker's advice to read the article, he had neither read nor heard
of the defendants' alleged misrepresentations. Id.
19. Id. at 1158-59. Defendants moved for a directed verdict on the ground
that Peil had failed to produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that
he had relied on defendants' alleged misrepresentations and omissions. Id. at
1158. In granting the directed verdict, the district court stated that Peil's testi-
mony that he was unaware of defendants' representations conclusively rebutted
the presumption of reliance. Id. at 1159. Specifically, the court stated that
" '[n]o reasonable person could conclude that the named plaintiff relied in any
way on any recommendation or misrepresentation by defendants .... The named
class representative's own testimony rebuts the presumption of reliance.' " Id.
at 1159 (citing App. at 1867-68). For a discussion of the necessity of proving
reliance in lob-5 actions, see supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
20. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1159. Asserting pendent jurisdiction, plaintiffs ap-
pended common-law claims of fraud, recklessness and misrepresentation to
their lOb-5(b) claim. Peil v. Speiser, 97 F.R.D. 657, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
21. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1159. The district court's definition of fraud on the
market was similar to that of the Third Circuit. See Peil v. Speiser, 97 F.R.D. 657,
663 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The Third Circuit defined fraud on the market as a theory
under which purchasers of securities can establish causation by demonstrating
that, in making their purchase, they relied on the market price of the stock which
had been "skewed" by the fraudulent actions of defendants. 806 F.2d at 1156.
For an elaboration of the court's interpretation of the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory, see infra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
22. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1159. Plaintiffs' claims were submitted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a). Id.
23. Id. The verdict for defendants on the § 11 claim resulted from the
jury's finding in response to a special interrogatory that the registration state-
ment and prospectus contained no false statements of material fact and made no
material omissions. Id. at n.8.
24. Id. at 1159. On appeal, the plaintiffs sought:
1) vacatur of the verdicts and the final judgment; 2) reversal of the
judgment on the § 11 claims; 3) a new trial on plaintiffs' § 10 and pen-
dent common law claims; and 4) a trial on a civil RICO (Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations) claim that the district court
refused to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to interpose.
920 [Vol. 32: p. 913
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The applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory to rule lOb-5
claims was a question of first impression for the Third Circuit. 25 In
holding that plaintiffs who purchase stock in an open and developed
market need not prove direct reliance on defendants' mispresentations,
but can satisfy their burden of proof on the element of causation by
showing that defendants made material misrepresentations, 26 Judge
Becker reviewed the legal background of rule lOb-5 and the fraud-on-
the-market theory. 2
7
As to the development of the theory in the Third Circuit, Judge
Becker stated that the court foreshadowed adoption of the theory in its
opinion in Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand.28 Sharp involved a question left
open by the United States Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States,2 9 in which the Court held that when the alleged fraud
consists chiefly of material omissions rather than affirmative misrepre-
sentations, reliance is to be presumed and the burden shifts to defend-
Id. The appeals court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id.
25. Id. at 1160.
26. Id. at 1161.
27. Id. at 1160-61. For a discussion of the legal background of rule lOb-5,
see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the legal back-
ground of the fraud-on-the-market theory, see supra notes 5-8 and accompany-
ing text.
28. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1161 n.1 1 (citing Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649
F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982)).
29. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Affiliated Ute involved a group of "mixed-bloods"
of the Ute Indian Tribe who sued a bank, two bank employees and the United
States, charging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-
5. Id. at 140. The claimed violations involved plaintiffs' sales of shares of the
Ute Distribution Corp. (UDC), a company formed to manage oil, gas and min-
eral rights and unadjudicated or unliquidated claims against the government as
part of a plan for distributing assets of the Ute tribe to individual "mixed-
bloods," in 1963 and 1964. Id. at 136. The Affiliated Ute Citizens (AUC) was an
unincorporated association formed along with the UDC to manage asset distri-
bution. Id. at 135-36. The case involved misrepresentations and omissions by
the defendant bank employees and a breach of a duty to disclose. Id. at 150-53.
The case, however, was primarily a duty-to-disclose case in which plaintiffs al-
leged that the "defendants devised a plan and induced the mixed-blood holders
of UDC stock to dispose of their shares without disclosing to them material facts
that reasonably could have been expected to influence their decisions to sell."
Id. at 153.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, upheld the appellate court's
determination that two defendant bank employees had violated rule lob-5 by
making misrepresentations of material fact within lOb-5(b), namely that the pre-
vailing market price of the UDC shares was the figure at which the defendants'
purchases had been made. Id. at 152. However, the Court focused primarily on
defendants' omissions and concluded that the Tenth Circuit had erred in hold-
ing that there was no violation of rule lob-5 unless the record disclosed evi-
dence of reliance on the misrepresentations. Id. Because paragraphs (a) and (c)
of rule lOb-5 do not contain the restriction of materiality, the Court read rule
lOb-5 more broadly in holding that proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery in such misrepresentation/omission cases. Id. For a concise statement
of the Court's holding, see infra note 30.
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ants to rebut it.3 0 In Sharp, the Third Circuit faced the question of
30. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1161 n. Il (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54).
Specifically, the Affiliated Ute Court held:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.
All that in necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense
that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the
making of this decision. This obligation to disclose and this withhold-
ing of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.
Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54 (citations omitted). The Third Circuit has held
this standard of materiality applicable to rule lob-5 actions, as well. See, e.g.,
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 1980). In
Healey, the plaintiff alleged that a material misrepresentation or omission on the
part of the defendants operated to prevent the plaintiff from enjoining a con-
templated merger through a state injunction. Id. at 646. The Third Circuit held
that in such a case the plaintiff must prove "that at the time of the misrepresen-
tation or omission, there was a reasonable probability of ultimate success in se-
curing an injunction had there been no misrepresentation or omission." Id. at
647. In so holding, the court defined materiality as " 'a substantial likelihood
that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.' " Id. (quoting
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
Two Second Circuit opinions subsequently developed the Affiliated Ute dis-
tinction, holding that victims of schemes to manipulate stock prices need only
establish causation and not reliance. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying Affiliated Ute in context of allega-
tions that defendant issued materially defective proxy statement which failed to
disclose manner in which defendant had inflated value of its shares at expense of
potential merger partner), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Chris-Craft Indus. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374-75 (2d Cir.)(applying Affiliated Ute in
context of allegations of securities law violations in connection with contest be-
tween two corporations for control of third corporation), cert denied, 414 U.S.
910 (1973). These decisions applied the fraud-on-the-market theory to situa-
tions in which the deceptions were carried out by someone other than the issuer
and the plaintiff's investment decision was less clearly linked to the deceptions.
Note, supra note 4, at 1147.
The purported reason for shifting the burden of proof as to the reliance
element in a case of material omission has been an assumption that the plaintiff
is generally incapable of proving that he relied on an ommission. Lewis v. Mc-
Graw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980). "This inca-
pacity arises from the difficulty of proving a speculative state of facts: Had the
facts not been omitted, would plaintiff have acted on the information made avail-
able and thereby averted his loss?" Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,
188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 935 (1982). However, the Sharp court
was troubled by this shift in the burden of proof for two reasons: (1) the defend-
ant, like the plaintiff, must prove a speculative state of facts in order to refute the
presumption of reliance and (2) the problem of speculation is not unique to
cases involving omissions. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit in Sharp concluded
that the proper approach to determining which party has the burden of proving
reliance is to examine "the plaintiff's allegations in light of the likely proof at
trial" and, from that examination, to place the burden of proof where it most
reasonably belongs. Id.
One commentator has reasoned that "[s]ince nothing is affirmatively repre-
sented in a non-disclosure case, demanding proof of reliance would require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that he had in mind the converse of the omitted facts,
which would be virtually impossible to demonstate in most cases." Note, The
[Vol. 32: p. 913922
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whether the burden should be similarly shifted in a case where plaintiffs
alleged both misrepresentations and omissions. 3 1 While refusing to
adopt a per se rule on the allocation of the burden of proof of reliance,
the court held that, on the facts of that case, it was appropriate to pre-
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584,
590 (1975)(footnote omitted).
For decisions indicating that the presumption of reliance is proper in cases
of alleged omissions, but that no presumption arises in cases of alleged misrep-
resentations, see Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717-18 (8th
Cir. 1978); Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1978); Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1975).
It is important to note the distinction between Affiliated Ute and Speiser, a
distinction which arguably explains why Affiliated Ute and its progeny are not con-
trolling here. Affiliated Ute involved material omissions by defendants. 406 U.S.
at 153-54. Speiser, conversely, involved affirmative misrepresentations by de-
fendants. 806 F.2d at 1156. The distinction between omissions and misrepre-
sentations can be determinative. Compare Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578
F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978)(in lob-5 action involving misleading prospectus on
bond issue, plaintiff not entitled to presumption of reliance because case was
pleaded as misrepresentation case) with Dekro v. Stern Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp.
406 (W.D. Mo. 1982)(in lob-5 action involving misleading bond offering circu-
lars, plaintiff entitled to presumption of reliance because he pleaded case as
omission case).
31. Sharp, 649 F.2d at 187. The Sharp court noted that Affiliated Ute made
clear that in at least some situations a presumption of reliance in favor of the
rule lob-5 plaintiff is proper. Id. (citing Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,
410 (3d Cir. 1974)).
In Sharp, the purchaser of a limited partnership interest in an oil and gas-
drilling venture brought a securities fraud suit against Coopers & Lybrand, the
accounting firm that had prepared an opinion letter dealing with tax treatment
of investors. Id. at 178-79. The plaintiff alleged violations of section 10(b) and
rule 1Ob-5, common-law fraud and breach of the common-law duty of due care.
Id. at 179 & n.3. After class certification and a jury trial, the jury found that the
tax opinion letter contained material misrepresentations and omissions and
awarded damages in the amount of the actual value of a proportionate share of
the partnership, Id. at 179. On appeal, the Third Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Aldisert, held that: 1) the accounting firm knew that investment decisions
would be made on the basis of the opinion letter and, therefore, the firm was
required to exercise a "stringent" duty to supervise its employees in drafting
and issuing the letter and could be held liable under the doctrine of respondant
superior; 2) the district court did not err in instructing the jury that the defend-
ant had the burden of refuting reliance; and 3) the district court erred in in-
structing the jury that the measure of damages was to be the actual value of an
interest in the partnership. Id. at 183-190.
The defendant accounting firm argued on appeal that the trial judge had
erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs were entitled to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance when plaintiffs alleged both omissions and misrepresenta-
tions. Id. at 185. The Third Circuit rejected appellant's assertion that the
presumption of reliance should be limited to omissions situations, noting the
analytical confusion and possible unfairness that would result from a strict appli-
cation of the omissions-misrepresentations dichotomy. Id. at 187-88. The Sharp
court stressed that reliance would be presumed only "where it is logical to do
so," and that a strict rule requiring the defendant to refute a presumption of
reliance would be neither equitable nor logical. Id. at 188 (citing Lewis v. Mc-
Graw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980)).
1987]
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sume reliance and to shift the burden to defendants to rebut that pre-
sumption. 32  Although the Sharp court did not expressly consider
whether to adopt the fraud-on-the-market theory, the court observed
that reliance was simply "one aspect of the ubiquitous requirement that
losses be causally related to the defendant's wrongful acts." '3 3 "Where it
is logical to do so," the court said, the burden should be shifted to de-
fendants to disprove reliance. 34
The Speiser court read Sharp as recognizing two important facts:
"1) that the linchpin of the reliance requirement is a causal connection
between defendants' actions and plaintiff's purchase of stock; and
2) that in certain cases, it is sensible to shift the burden of disproving
reliance to the defendants. ' '3 5 The court in Speiser believed the fraud-
on-the-market theory to follow from a combination of these observa-
tions.3 6 Judge Becker noted that, in the case of a developed market, a
plaintiff's securities purchase can be causally related to the defendants'
misrepresentations even if plaintiffs did not directly rely on the misrep-
resentations. 3 7 "Moreover," Judge Becker concluded, "the likelihood
of this causal connection is so strong that it is logical to presume reli-
ance and to shift the burden of rebutting that presumption to defend-
ants." 38 Sharp thus supports the Third Circuit's adoption of the fraud-
on-the-market theory, according to the Speiser court.
39
32. Id. at 189. The Sharp court expressly declined to adopt a strict rule
allocating the burden of proof as to reliance. See id. at 188-89. The court re-
mained unpersuaded that the existence of misrepresentations or omissions,
without more, necessitated any particular treatment of the reliance issue. Id. at
188. Additionally, the court noted that a strict misrepresentation-omission di-
chotomy would necessitate a problematic, dual jury instruction in such cases. Id.
The Sharp court thus favored a more flexible solution and concluded that the
proper approach to the reliance problem is to "analyze the plaintiff's allega-
tions, in light of the likely proof at trial, and determine the most reasonable
placement of the burden of proof of reliance." Id. (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S.
at 153-54 ("positive proof of reliance" not required "under the circumstances of
this case")). This flexible approach, the Sharp court noted, "avoids the potential
problems of a broad judicial pronouncement of a precept governing reliance."
Id. at 189 (footnote omitted). Applying this flexible approach to the facts of
Sharp, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's placement of the burden on
Coopers & Lybrand because the defendant "undoubtedly foresaw" that its opin-
ion letter would influence investors. Id.
33. Id. at 186 (citing Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d
Cir. 1974)).
34. Id. at 187-88 (quoting Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d. Cir.
1980)).
35. 806 F.2d at 1161 n.ll.
36. Id.
37. Id. For a discussion of the proposition that the fraud-on-the-market
theory should be limited to developed markets, as opposed to markets for new
or restricted securities, see infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
38. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1161 n.11.
39. Id. (citing In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142 (N.D.Tex.
1980)("Market reliance theory can also be viewed as an extension of the pre-
12
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Judge Becker next turned to the central issue in Speiser, the applica-
bility of the fraud-on-the-market theory to rule lOb-5(b) claims. 40 De-
fendant Speiser argued from several cases that applied the fraud-on-the-
market theory to lOb-5(a) and (c) allegations of a widespread scheme to
defraud, but declined to apply it where plaintiffs alleged only misrepre-
sentations or omissions under lOb-5(b). 4 1 The court stated that, for its
purposes, the "salient distinction" between paragraph (b) and
paragraphs (a) and (c) is that the latter arguably require proof of a
scheme to defraud, whereas paragraph (b) is "indisputably satisfied by a
single fraudulent action."'4 2
Even assuming the validity of such a distinction, however, the court
stated that the existence of a scheme to defraud is irrelevant to the appli-
cability of the fraud-on-the-market theory because plaintiffs must still
show that defendant's misrepresentations were material under the the-
ory.43 The court noted that, by definition, material misrepresentations
or omissions are likely to influence the behavior of buyers and sellers,
sumption of reliance in omission cases to misrepresentation cases involving mar-
ket transactions."))
40. Id. at 1162. Defendants did not contest the validity of the fraud-on-the-
market theory generally, but argued that it ought to be limited to rule lOb-5(a)
and (c) claims, and that plaintiffs should retain the burden of establishing direct
reliance in rule lOb-5(b) claims. Id. Conversely, plaintiffs argued that there was
no reason for limiting the theory in such a manner and that it ought to be ap-
plied to all rule lOb-5 claims, whether under paragraph (a), (b) or (c). Id. The
court noted that this issue was "complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the
differences and overlap among the three [paragraphs] of rule lOb-5." Id. (foot-
note omitted). For the text of rule 1Ob-5, see supra note 3.
41. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1162-1163 & n. 16. For cases limiting the application
of the fraud-on-the-market theory to particular classes of lob-5 actions, see
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 467-72 (5th Cir. May 1981)(en banc) (holding the-
ory applicable to paragraph (a) and (c) allegations of a pervasive scheme, but
inapplicable to paragraph (b) claims of particular misrepresentations or omis-
sions), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981)(reliance presumed for omissions falling within
first or third paragraphs of rule lOb-5 but not presumed for misrepresentations
or omissions falling within second paragraph), niodified on other grounds men., 650
F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375
(1983); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(plaintiff's
burden of establishing illegal course of conduct satisfied by proving evidence of
scheme itself, materiality of misstatements and omissions and some level of sci-
enter on part of defendants; burden then shifts to defendants to rebut presump-
tion of reliance). See also 4 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22.10 at
23 (2d ed. 1985)(assuming fraud-on-the-market theory to be applicable only to
rule lOb-5(a) and (c) claims involving schemes).
42. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1162. The Supreme Court has reached a similar
conclusion as to the distinction between paragraph (b) of rule lob-5 and
paragraphs (a) and (c). See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 151-54. In Affiliated Ute, the
Court noted that paragraph (b) premises liability on material misstatements, but
that the other paragraphs are broader, encompassing " 'a course of business' or
a 'device, scheme or artifice' " that operates as a fraud. Id. at 153. For the text
of rule lOb-5, see supra note 3.
43. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1162.
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and thus affect the market.4 4 "A single misrepresentation or omission,
like a more widespread scheme, may artificially inflate the price of stock
and thus defraud plaintiffs who rely on the price of the stock in deciding
to purchase shares," Judge Becker stated. 45
The Third Circuit found the district court's and the defendants' ex-
planation of why rule lOb-5(b) claims should be exempt from the fraud-
on-the-market theory unpersuasive. 4 6 Judge Becker distinguished
Speiser from Shores v. Sklar 4 7 which held that the theory applies to para-
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Rosenberg v. Digilog, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (E.D. Pa.
1985)(applying fraud-on-the-market theory to 10b-5(b) action). In Digilog, the
district court stated that imposing the requirement of a scheme "creates another
burden which could effectively preclude the maintenance of otherwise legitimate
suits under the securities laws. Securities legislation, enacted for the purpose of
avoiding fraud, is intended by Congress to be construed ... flexibly to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes." Rosenberg v. Digilog, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
46. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1162. The court stated that "[n]either the district
court nor defendants have explained why rule 1Ob-5(b) claims should be exempt
from the 'fraud on the market' theory." Id. The defendants relied chiefly on
Shores v. Sklar. 806 F.2d at 1162 (citing Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.
May 1981)(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983)). For a discussion of Sklar
see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
47. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981)(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102
(1983). The plaintiff's decedent in Sklar purchased industrial development
bonds on the advice of his broker, without having seen the allegedly fraudulent
offering circular. Id. at 463-64. The sole source of the income necessary to
amortize the bonds defaulted almost immediately, causing the value of the
bonds to drop dramatically. Id. at 463-64. The plaintiff sued most of those
involved with the issuance of the bonds, alleging that he had been made the
victim of a widespread scheme to defraud investors in violation of the securities
laws. Id. at 464. Defendant Sklar was the attorney who prepared the offering
circular. Id. at 465. He allegedly omitted information concerning an SEC inves-
tigation and subsequent commencement of a civil action against one of the un-
derwriters of the bond issue. Id.
The Fifth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, held that plaintiff had failed to
state a cause of action under rule 10b-5(b). Id. at 468. The plaintiff based his
claim upon an allegation that the offering circular contained material misrepre-
sentations and omissions which, admittedly, he had neither relied upon nor
read. Id. Although the court noted that plaintiff had not read or otherwise re-
lied on the circular, it stated that plaintiff's further allegations were sufficient to
state a claim under rule lOb-5(a) or (c). Id. at 469. These allegations included
charges based on the circular's false statements or misleading omissions and
other allgations that the existence of the security in the marketplace resulted
from successful perpetration of fraud on the investment community and that
plaintiff had purchased in reliance on the market. Id.
The court noted that, while failure to read the circular or otherwise rely on
it would defeat a 10b-5(b) claim, the plaintiff had stated a cause of action under
the broader language of 10b-5(a) or lOb-5(c), because the circular was part of an
elaborate fraudulent scheme. Id. at 469-70; see also Note, supra note 4, at 1153
(noting that Sklar holding is limited to new issues and arguably requires conspir-
acy among issuer and other parties involved in initial underwriting and selling
effort for recovery). Responding to criticism from the dissent, the Sklar court
argued that misrepresentation and omission cases under 10b-5(b), requiring re-
926 [Vol. 32: p. 913
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graph (a) and (c) allegations of a pervasive scheme but is inapplicable to
paragraph (b) claims of particular misrepresentations or omissions. 4 8
The basis for the distinction was that Sklar involved a newly issued secur-
ity rather than a security already being traded in a well-developed mar-
ket.4 9 The Sklar rationale was inapplicable, according to the Speiser
court, because a well-developed market, in contrast to the market for a
newly issued security, can "reasonably be presumed to respond to even
a single material misrepresentation or omission concerning a stock al-
ready being traded in that market." 5
0
The Speiser court also rejected other authority cited by the appellees
in their attempt to limit the fraud-on-the-market theory. That authority
included one circuit court opinion and one district court opinion, each
of which applied the fraud-on-the-market theory to lOb-5(a) and (c) alle-
gations of a widespread scheme, while refusing to apply it where only
misrepresentations or omissions under lOb-5(b) were alleged.5 1
liance on the document making the misrepresentation or omitting a material
fact, are "inapposite to a case in which the buyer relied on the integrity of the
market to furnish securities which were not the product of a fraudulent scheme."
Sklar, 647 F.2d at 471 (citing Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978);
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 891; Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975)).
48. Sklar, 647 F.2d at 467-70.
49. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1162. Sklar involved the purchase of revenue bonds
issued by an industrial development board. See Sklar, 647 F.2d at 463. Speiser, in
contrast, involved the purchase of widely traded corporate stock on the open
market. See 806 F.2d at 1157. According to the Speiser court's reading of Sklar,
the Sklar court "believed it unlikely that a single misrepresentation or omission
would result in the sale of a new security; only a widespread scheme could have
that effect." Id. at 1162-63.
50. 806 F.2d at 1163 (footnote omitted). The Speiser court added that there
has been some disagreement as to the exact holding of Sklar and the stength of
the Sklar rationale for limiting the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. at 1162 (cit-
ing Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 747 n.l 1 (11 th Cir. 1984)(expres-
sing discomfort with Sklar's limitation of fraud-on-the-market theory to cases
involving scheme), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985)). In Speiser, Judge Becker
pointed out that there was a suggestion in Sklar that "the court believed
the .. . theory to be applicable only in the case of newly-issued [sic] stocks that
would not have been sold at all-and hence would not have been issued- with-
out the issuer's fraudulent conduct." Id. at 1163 n.15 (citing Sklar, 647 F.2d at
47 1)(emphasis in original). Judge Becker stated, however, that even though the
Eleventh Circuit was precedentially bound by Sklar, that circuit has rejected such
a reading as "untenable," and that no other courts have posited such a limita-
tion. Id. (citing Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 745 (11 th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985)). Therefore, Judge Becker concluded that,
"[r]egardless of what Sklar did in fact hold, we agree with the Lipton court that
there is no rationale for limiting the 'fraud on the market' theory to the issuance
of new securities." Id.
51. Id. at 1163 n.16 (citing Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2d
534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds mem., 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Mottoros v.
Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1981)). The Speiser court noted, how-
ever, that neither of these courts had articulated a valid reason for applying the
distinction. Id. at 1163 n.16.
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Having concluded that the fraud-on-the-market theory of causation
applies to lOb-5(b) claims, the court turned to the dispute over the
preclusive effect of the jury's verdict for defendants on the rule lOb-5(a)
and (c) claims. 52 The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to a new trial
on the lOb-5(b) claim if the court found the fraud-on-the-market theory
applicable to lOb-5(b) actions. 5 3 Judges Seitz and Higginbotham dis-
agreed with plaintiff's argument, holding that the jury necessarily ad-
dressed the rule lOb-5(b) claim, which was based on misstatements, in
finding defendants not liable under rule lOb-5(a) and (c), thus preclud-
ing a new trial on the lOb-5(b) claim.5 4 The majority's holding turned
chiefly on the jury's negative answer to a special interrogatory, under
which a jury finding of even a single fraudulent act, including a single
misstatement, would have warranted an affirmative answer. 55 In sum-
Moreover, the Speiser court stated that the seminal fraud-on-the-market case,
Blackie v. Barrack, apparently involved a lOb-5(b) claim. Id. (citing Blackie, 524
F.2d at 891). Although the Blackie court never explicitly stated under which par-
agraph of rule 10b-5 the plaintiff's claim fell, the Speiser court noted that the case
involved only a few misrepresentations in a company's annual report and the
court "quite clearly did not require a scheme in order to invoke the fraud on the
market theory." Id.; see also Rosenburg v. Digilog, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) ("Blackie did not require proof of a 'common scheme.' "); Note, supra
note 4, at 1148 n.25 ("The Blackie reasoning makes a fraud-on-the-market theory
available in a rule lOb-5(b) claim as well as in claims based on 1Ob-5(a) and lOb-
5(c)."). For a discussion of Blackie, see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
52. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1163-67.
53. Id. at 1164-65.
54. Id. at 1165. Judge Becker dissented on the preclusion issue. 806 F.2d
at 1167-68 (Becker, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Becker differed from the
majority on this issue based chiefly on his reading of the charge to the jury. Id.
at 1167 (Becker, J., dissenting). The majority concluded that the jury instruction
did not preclude a finding of liability based on a single misstatement. Id. at
1165-66. Judge Becker, however, asserted that the district court's instruction
gave the jury the "clear impression" that, while it was to consider any misrepre-
sentations or omissions, such acts could violate the rule only if they were part of a
larger scheme. Id. at 1167. (Becker, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Under a
previously enunciated standard concerning potential jury confusion, Judge
Becker stated that the court was required to reverse and remand for a new trial
on the lOb-5(b) issue. Id. (citing Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir.)
(reversal appropriate because relationship between proximate cause and con-
tributory negligence was not properly clarified forjury), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977)). Given the confusion as to whether the jury charge allowed liability
based on a single misstatement or omission, he asserted that the plaintiff's lOb-
5(b) claim could not be said to have been rejected by the jury. Id. at 1167
(Becker, J., dissenting). In conclusion, Judge Becker stated that the district
court had erred in granting a directed verdict for defendants on the lOb-5(b)
claim and by holding that the jury verdict on the paragraph (a) and (c) claims
was not preclusive. Id. at 1168 (Becker, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1165-66. In permitting the plaintiffs to proceed on a fraud-on-
the-market theory with respect to their rule lOb-5(a) and (c) claims, the district
court charged the jury accordingly and submitted the following special
interrogatory:
Did any of the following defendants knowingly or recklessly employ any
device, scheme or artifice which defrauded plaintiffs in connection with
16
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mary, the Third Circuit stated that the error of the district court in tak-
ing the lOb-5(b) claim from the jury was harmless "because none of the
plaintiffs' evidence was excluded and the jury's determinations on the
(a) and (c) claims necessarily excluded any factual basis for liability on
the (b) claim." 5 6
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's acceptance of the fraud-on-
the-market theory of causation in Speiser is a sensible adoption of princi-
ples previously enunciated in Blackie57 and Sharp.58 These cases recog-
nized that it is difficult if not impossible for a plaintiff to prove subjective
reliance on specific misrepresentations or omissions of defendants in
cases in which an investor has purchased securities in an open, devel-
oped market. 59 Given the intent of Congress to prevent all deceptive
and manipulative practices in connection with the sale of securities, it is
incongruous in such cases for courts to require proof that the plaintiff
investor relied directly on the misrepresentation or omission. 60 Adop-
their purchase or sale of Health-Chem stock, or knowingly or recklessly
engaged in any act, practice or course of business which operated as a
fraud or deceit upon plaintiffs in connection with their purchase or sale
of Health-Chem stock?
Id. at 1165. The jury answered the interrogatory in the negative, and the court
entered a verdict for defendants on both the rule lOb-5(a) and (c) claims. Id.
On appeal, defendants argued that the jury's negative answer to the special
interrogatory required the court to conclude that defendants had committed no
improper act, including any misrepresentations or omissions in violation of rule
lOb-5(b). Id. at 1164. Plaintiffs, conversely, asserted that the interrogatory,
when read in conjunction with the court's charge to the jury, dictated that only a
"scheme" to defraud warranted a finding of liability. Id. at 1164-65 & n.18. Re-
call that paragraphs (a) and (c) arguably require proof of a scheme to defraud,
while clause (b) is satisfied by a single fraudulent action. Id. at 1162. For a
discussion of this distinction, see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
In support of its holding that the jury's finding was preclusive, the majority
stated that: 1) none of the plaintiff's evidence was withheld from the jury as a
result of the directed verdict on the lOb-5(b) claim; 2) in charging the jury on
the paragraph (a) and (c) claims, the court defined each element required to
prove a section (b) claim; and 3) under the interrogatory, a single fraudulent act,
even a single misstatement, would have warranted an affirmative answer. Speiser,
806 F.2d at 1165-66.
56. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1167.
57. For a discussion of Blackie, the seminal fraud-on-the-market case, see
supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
58. For a discussion of Sharp, the Third Circuit opinion that arguably fore-
shadowed the court's holding in Speiser, see supra notes 28-39 and accompanying
text. As noted by the Speiser court, the fraud-on-the-market theory is now
"widely accepted." For a list of circuits that have accepted the theory, see supra
note 7.
59. See Sharp, 649 F.2d at 188-89; Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
60. Note, supra note 2, at 645. In enacting the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Exchange Act, Congress intended to protect investors in the national securi-
ties markets and to promote informed investment decisions by requiring full
disclosure of material information with respect to the issuance and trading of
securities. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (letter from Franklin D.
Roosevelt to Duncan V. Fletcher, chairman of the Banking and Currency Con-
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tion of the fraud-on-the-market theory eases plaintiff's burden of proof
in these cases, and thereby promotes the deterrent effect of rule lOb-5
and contributes to achieving the goals for which Congress enacted the
securities legislation. 6
1
Opponents of the fraud-on-the-market theory of causation have ad-
vanced numerous arguments in opposition to this extension of the se-
curities laws. 6 2 Despite the surface appeal of some of these assertions, it
mittee, February 9, 1934), 2-4 (discussion of investigation of securities sales
practices conducted by Committee on Banking and Currency and general analy-
sis of Senate bill) (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11
(1934)(manipulative practices are prohibited to "insure to the multitude of in-
vestors the maintenance of fair and honest markets"). For the House report on
the Securities Act of 1933, see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933)
("there should be full disclosure of every essentially important element" con-
cerning sale of securities). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
195 (1976) (Securities Act of 1933 was "designed to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information" concerning issuance of securities; Exchange
Act "was intended to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices").
Courts developed the fraud-on-the-market theory to "enhance the enforceabil-
ity" of these laws. Note, supra note 2, at 645; see also Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907
(court eliminated requirement that plaintiff prove reliance in open market case
because to do otherwise would leave such plaintiffs unprotected).
The effectiveness of the securities laws is, of course, dependent upon their
enforceability. Note, supra note 2, at 645 n.106. The fraud-on-the-market the-
ory closes a "loophole" in the scheme of federal securities regulations. Id. In
allowing investors who cannot prove actual reliance nevertheless to bring their
claims, the courts acknowledge the "practical realities of securities trading in the
national securities markets." Id.
61. Note, supra note 2, at 645-46 (asserting that fraud-on-the-market the-
ory, by promoting honest and efficient market, can also increase investors' confi-
dence in marketplace).
62. Id. at 646-54; see Black, supra note 7, at 457-68. In his article, Black
states that the principal objections to the fraud-on-the-market theory are that "it
contradicts the disclosure rationale of federal securities regulation, increases the
likelihood of complex litigation of questionable utility, and makes the potential
damages claims exorbitant." Black, supra note 7, at 457. The first objection is
not persuasive, given evidence that there is no rational reason for a reasonable
investor to himself read disclosure documents. See id. at 458; cf Kripke, The Myth
of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 632 (1973) (usefulness of disclosure is
limited because documents are directed at "man in the street" instead of those
with sophisticated knowledge who could make investment decisions)[hereinafter
Kripke, The Myth].
Whether adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory as a means of encour-
aging class action suits is an appropriate policy depends on one's evaluation of
the benefits of private securities fraud actions. Black, supra note 7, at 459. Ac-
ceptance of Black's second objection to fraud on the market thus turns on one's
opinion of private enforcement of securities laws. See id. For an argument that
qualified adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory serves to promote the pur-
pose and effect of federal securities laws, see surpa note 60.
Finally, while computation of damages in fraud-on-the-market cases may
certainly be problematic, it is submitted that concern over large "windfall" dam-
age awards is not sufficient reason to justify denying recovery to investors who,
although they cannot prove direct reliance on defendant's misrepresentations,
suffer quantifiable loss at the hands of market manipulators. For a discussion of
the damage issue in connection with fraud-on-the-market litigation, see Black,
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is submitted that few withstand analysis. One recurrent argument is that
the fraud-on-the-market theory runs counter to the trend of the
Supreme Court's rule lOb-5 cases since 1975, which has been to restrict
the plaintiff class and the range of potential liability. 63 While that may
well be the trend in the law, none of the fraud-on-the-market decisions
conflicts with any of these Supreme Court holdings. 64
In addition, other critics contend that this extension of the federal
securities laws will render the expensive and time-consuming disclo-
sures required by the securities laws meaningless and will establish a
scheme of "investors' insurance."' 65 This argument misconceives the
importance of documents filed with the SEC and does not comport with
the manner in which the typical investor makes decisions. 66 It is the rare
supra note 7, at 441-42 n.30, 460-61 (difficulty in computing damages, along with
fact that most cases are settled before trial, supports argument that securities
fraud litigation can be "ruinous" to corporation). See also Note, The Measure of
Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371
(1974) (methods for computing damages previously employed in 1Ob-5 cases are
inapplicable to actively traded stocks; investors in such stocks should receive no
more than out-of-pocket loss).
63. Note, supra note 4, at 1160; see also Sklar, 647 F.2d at 484-85 (Randall,J.,
dissenting); Black supra note 7, at 459-60 & n.155. For cases illustrating this
trend, see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter requirement applicable
to injunctive action); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (in nondis-
closure case defendant must have duty to disclose to be held liable under lOb-5);
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (10b-5 does not reach breach of
fiduciary duty of majority shareholders to minority when there is no allegation of
misrepresentation or deception); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (establishing requirement of scienter for lOb-5 damages actions); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (restricting plaintiff
class in lOb-5 actions to those who actually bought or sold securities).
64. Note, supra note 4, at 1160. It is submitted that the Supreme Court's
failure to address the fraud-on-the-market issue in the numerous security cases
where it has had the opportunity to do so arguably implies tacit acceptance of
the theory by the Court. One can assume that if the Court were dissatisfied with
the increasing use of the theory, it would have taken the opportunity to express
its objections.
65. See Sklar, 647 F.2d at 483 (Randall,J., dissenting); see also List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). The
SEC requires the filing of a prospectus and other reports upon issuance of secur-
ities. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 77(e), (j), 78(m) (1982). These documents are generally
long, complex and of little value to the average investor until they have been
interpreted by a financial professional or reflected by the market's pricing mech-
anism. See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 24-26 (1979); Kripke, The Myth, supra note 62, at 632 (it is
"myth" that prospectus can be and is used by layman); Note, supra note 2, at 646
(length and complexity of documents discourages average investor from reading
documents).
66. Note, supra note 2, at 646. In reality, investment decisions are made
through a "trickle down" process in which financial intermediaries, such as in-
vestment analysts, play an integral role in interpreting and translating the com-
plex financial data disclosed by security issuers. Id. ; see also H. KRIPKE, supra note
65, at 14; Note, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1077-79 (1977).
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investor who digests the lengthy and complex filing documents required
by federal securities laws. 67 Indeed, most investors rely on someone
else to interpret and translate information disclosed to the SEC. 68
Thus, the fraud-on-the-market theory comports with the reality of secur-
ities investment by not requiring a showing of direct reliance on the is-
suer's documents, and instead presumes an indirect reliance on others
and on the market for interpretation of these complex documents. 69
Furthermore, the Third Circuit's adoption of the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory hardly opens the floodgates to a tide of lOb-5 litigation. The
theory merely allows a plaintiff whose injuries resulted from trading in
open-market transactions to benefit from several rebuttable presump-
tions. These include the presumptions that the dissemination of mate-
rial misrepresentations or omissions distorts securities' prices and that
the plaintiff relied on the efficiency of the market's "valuation mecha-
nism" to establish prices that reflect all available financial information. 70
The class of potential plaintiffs is of necessity limited. At some point, an
investor's reliance on market analysis and prices becomes so attenuated
that his imprudence becomes superceding, and courts should deny re-
covery, thus preserving the analytical integrity of the securities laws. 7 1
Regardless of the application of the fraud-on-the-market theory, a plain-
tiff's reliance must still be reasonable or justifiable. 72 For instance, had
67. Black, supra note 7, at 458 (few investors actually read and understand
disclosure documents).
68. Note, supra note 2, at 646 & n. 111. At least one author has asserted that
the SEC's assumption that informed investment decisions can be made from
SEC disclosures is unrealistic. See Kripke, The Myth, supra note 62, at 633. Pro-
fessor Kripke argues that investors make decisions by extrapolating securities'
potential from companies' past financial performance, not by relying on specific
documents filed by securities issuers with the SEC. Id. at 637.
69. See Black, supra note 7, at 458-59.
70. Note, supra note 2, at 647.
71. Id. at 650. "[C]ausation becomes less proximate as an investor's rela-
tionship with the deception becomes more remote." Id. At some point, an in-
vestor's loss must be caused by his own failure to properly investigate, rather
than the alleged deception or market interference. Id.; see also Sklar, 647 F.2d at
470 n.6 (citing Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977)) (reasonable reliance means not intentionally refusing to inves-
tigate in disregard of known risk); Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785,
787, 790 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendants rebutted plaintiff's proof of reliance by
showing that plaintiff relied on advice of three physicians and not on defendant's
alleged deception).
72. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981),
inodified on other grounds mem., 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). The Huddleston court distinguished
between reasonable and justifiable reliance. Id. at 548. Specifically the court
noted that the latter requires an objective or "reasonable man" test. Id. (citing 5
A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1Ob-5 § 64.01(b) (ii) (Supp. 1980)). In so do-
ing, the court observed that the former "contemplates a subjective reliance stan-
dard, tempered by the requirement of due diligence on the part of the plaintiff,
rather than the objective reliance test applicable under the justifiable reliance
concept." Id. The Fifth Circuit has also noted that reliance requires only that
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the appellant in Speiser purchased stock after simply hearing about the
Financial World article from a neighbor, his reliance would have been un-
reasonable and he arguably could have been denied recovery on that
ground. 73
Those who warn of a deluge of vexatious lOb-5 actions fail to recog-
nize that adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory does not require
courts to impose liability more often or to award damages more liber-
ally.74 Courts still have considerable discretion in determining who may
proceed under rule lOb-5 and how much they may recover. 75 The judi-
ciary retains its gatekeeping function in certifying a group of investors as
a class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7
6
Additionally, plaintiffs must still plead and prove the other elements of
their rule lOb-5 actions. Relaxing the plaintiff's burden as to causation
does not relieve the plaintiff of proving the justifiability of reliance and
the independent elements of scienter, materiality and damages. 7 7
It also bears emphasis that the fraud-on-the-market theory, as
adopted by the Third Circuit, merely sets up several rebuttable pre-
the plaintiff must not "intentionally refuse[ ] to investigate 'in disregard of a risk
known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and
so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.' " Dupuy v. Du-
puy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (4th ed. 1971)). For a discussion of reliance in
lOb-5 actions, see Note, supra note 30.
73. See Note, supra note 2, at 650. The commentator suggested that, if the
plaintiff in Panzirer v. Wolf had been allowed to recover under these hypothetical
facts, then this extension of the fraud-on-the-market theory would produce the
undesirable result of "investors' insurance." Id. (citing Panzirer v. Wolf, 663
F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107, vacated as moot sub nom. Price
Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982)). In Panzirer, the plaintiff relied
upon a favorable article in the Wall Street Journal, which she had read in making
her decision to purchase a corporation's stock. Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107, vacated as moot sub nora. Price
Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982).
74. Note, supra note 2, at 653.
75. Id. at 653-54.
76. Id. at 654 & n.147. Before a group of investors can proceed in a class
action, the court must first certify the group as a class. Id. at 654. In so doing,
the court must "find that questions of law or fact common to the group
predominate over questions pertaining only to individual members, that the rep-
resentative plaintiff's claims typify those of the class, and that [the representative
plaintiff] can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Id. (citing
FED. R. Civ. P. 23). For an example of a court making a class certification ruling,
see Peil v. Speiser, 97 F.R.D. 657, 658-62 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
77. Note, supra note 2, at 654. One commentator has noted that the plain-
tiff's task of demonstrating that the defendant intended his misrepresentation or
omission to defraud investors "independently protects corporations and courts
from the onslaught of litigation anticipated by the theory's critics." Id. Accord-
ing to that commentator, the difficulty of establishing scienter will further dis-
courage attorneys from accepting potentially lucrative lob-5 cases on a
contingent fee basis. Id. n.152.
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sumptions that may, by definition, be overcome by the defendants. 78
Several important defenses still exist. Despite the presumption of reli-
ance, a lOb-5 defendant may nevertheless escape liability by proving
that the market did not respond to the alleged misrepresentations or
omissions (immateriality defense), or that plaintiffs knew of the falsity of
defendants' misrepresentations or would have purchased the securities
even if they had known of them (nonreliance defense). 79
78. Id. at 647; see also Black, supra note 7, at 447 (plaintiff is afforded rebut-
table presumption of reliance under prevailing view). Black, however, cautions
against the total elimination of the reliance requirement in lOb-5 actions, espe-
cially in cases of less actively traded securities. Black, supra note 7, at 472. She
agrees, though, that affording plaintiff a presumption of reliance in the case of
widely traded securities "follows logically from the efficient-market theory" and
that it is "appropriate to transfer to the defendant the burden of disproving
reliance." Id. at 473.
The Third Circuit's view of the role of reliance as adopted in Speiser must be
contrasted with the "pure causation" approach to rule lob-5 liability. See id. at
448-49. Under the "pure-causation" approach, the only purpose of proving re-
liance is to establish causation. Id. at 448. If other means can be employed to
establish causation then the need to demonstrate reliance is obviated. Id. A
material misstatement, which substitutes for proof of causation, thus establishes
plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. at 449. This is to be contrasted with the prevail-
ing view which the Third Circuit followed. Under this view, the plaintiff is af-
forded a rebuttable presumption of indirect reliance, necessarily easing his
burden in establishing a prima facie case. Id. at 447-48.
For some recent decisions espousing the rebuttable presumption approach
adopted by the Speiser court, see Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 742
(11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F.
Supp. 254, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs. of Boston, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 246, 262 (N.D. Cal. 1978). For some of the decisions adopting the pure
causation approach, see T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation
Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026
(1984); Sklar, 647 F.2d at 468; Fausett v. American Resources Mgmt. Corp., 542
F. Supp. 1234, 1238-39 (D. Utah 1982).
79. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1161. For a more extensive discussion of the de-
fenses to an implied lOb-5 action, see Note, Fraud on the Market, supra note 7, at
987-93. There, the commentator argues that the defenses of nonreliance and
immateriality are inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the fraud-on-the-
market claim. Id. at 986-87. He rejects the nonreliance defense by asserting that
mere "[i]nvesting in the market demonstrates sufficient reliance on it, because
no investor assumes the risk of fraud affecting the security's price." Id. at 988.
A variation of this defense, or the "would have purchased anyway" defense, is,
according to the commentator, also inconsistent with the concept of an efficient
market, in which investors would pay a different price if there had not been a
fraud on the market. Id. at 989. Rather than focusing on these supposed de-
fenses, the proper inquiry under the assumption of an efficient market is
whether the market price of the stock was affected. Id. at 990. Finally, the au-
thor asserts that the "efficient market underpinnings of the fraud on the market
theory" should eliminate the materiality defense for three reasons: (1) the effect
of any announcement exposing a misrepresentation can be measured for its ef-
fect on the market price of the security; (2) the difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween information that will influence the investor's decision and information
that will not; and (3) the measure of damages in the fraud-on-the-market action
does not require threshold materiality as in the traditional lob-5 action. Id. at
991-92.
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It is further submitted that the Speiser court, in refusing to limit ap-
plication of the fraud-on-the-market theory to lOb-5(a) and (c) claims,
correctly rejected the questionable rationale of Shores v. Sklar.80 Sklar, it
will be recalled, held the theory applicable to paragraph (a) and (c) alle-
gations of a pervasive scheme, but inapplicable to paragraph (b) claims
of particular misrepresentations or omissions. 8 1 Sklar is factually distin-
According to another author, there are four defenses under the prevailing
view of the fraud-on-the-market theory: (1) defendant can attempt to demon-
strate the immaterality of the misstatement; (2) defendant can show that an in-
sufficient number of traders relied on the misstatement, and that the price was
not affected by it; (3) defendant can prove that an individual plaintiff had
purchased the security despite his knowledge of the material misstatement; and
(4) defendant can demonstrate that an individual plaintiff would have purchased
even if he had known of the falsity. Black, supra note 7, at 448.
In Speiser, the defendants urged that, even if the court would apply the
fraud-on-the-market theory to the plaintiff's rule 10b-5(b) claim, Peil's testi-
mony that he had not directly relied on the alleged misrepresentations conclu-
sively rebutted the presumption of reliance. 806 F.2d at 1163. The court
rejected this contention, however, noting that the defendants had not attempted
to establish either means of rebutting reliance: "1) the misrepresentations did
not affect the market price of the stock; or 2) plaintiff would have purchased the
stock even at the price it would have been at but for the misrepresentations." Id.
According to the court, Peil's testimony "established only that he did not rely
directly on defendants' misrepresentations, a fact that is not relevant under the
fraud on the market approach." Id. (emphasis in original). The court added that
the defendants misunderstood the theory since the theory permits a plaintiff to
prevail even though he was completely unaware of the misstatements. Id.
Although under Speiser, the fraud-on-the-market theory is good law with re-
spect to the Securities Acts, no state courts have adopted the theory. Id. at 1163
n.17; see also Rosenberg v. Digilog, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 43-44 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Thus, direct reliance remains an element of a plaintiff's common-law securities
fraud claim. 806 F.2d at 1163 n.17. For this reason, the Third Circuit stated
that the district court's direction of a verdict against Peil on his common-law
claims was proper. Id.
80. Several courts and commentators have questioned the Sklar holding.
See Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1162-63 & n.15 (questioning whether Sklar court was cor-
rect in requiring direct reliance on misrepresentations); Lipton v. Documation,
Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 747 n. I (11 th Cir. 1984) (expressing discomfort with Sklar's
limitation of theory to cases involving scheme), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985);
Note, supra note 2, at 644 n. 105 (noting that Sklar decision has not been "univer-
sally well-received").
Other courts have held directly contrary to the Sklar decision. See, e.g.,
Blackie, 524 F.2d 891; Rosenberg v. Digilog, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Pa.
1985). The Digilog court noted that imposing the requirement of a scheme "cre-
ates another burden which could effectively preclude the maintenance of other-
wise legitimate suits under the securities laws." Rosenberg v. Digilog, Inc., 648
F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1985). In addition, the court reiterated that Congress
intended that securities legislation, enacted for the purpose of avoiding fraud,
be construed flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes. Id. For a further dis-
cussion of Sklar, see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
81. Sklar, 647 F.2d at 467-70. The district court in Speiser followed Sklar and
agreed with defendants' argument that the plaintiffs should retain the burden of
establishing direct reliance in rule lOb-5(b) claims. 806 F.2d at 1162. In re-jecting this position, the Third Circuit noted that, in addition to the Fifth Circuit
in Sklar, only one other circuit court and one district court have applied the
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guishable from Speiser in that it involved an issue of new securities rather
than a security already being traded in a well-developed market.8 2 The
Sklar rationale is arguably inapplicable in a well-developed market,
which "can reasonably be presumed to respond to even a single material
misrepresentation or omission concerning a stock already being traded
in that market."'8s Assuming the validity of the efficient-market hypothe-
sis, 8 4 it is submitted that the thesis that the well-developed market is
distorted by a lOb-5(b) violation as well as by a lOb-5(a) or (c) violation
is correct.
Despite the virtues of the fraud-on-the-market theory, it is sug-
gested that courts should limit application of the principle to situations
involving developed markets, as opposed to new or undeveloped mar-
kets where the efficient-market hypothesis is unlikely to hold true. 85
fraud-on-the-market theory to lOb-5(a) and (c) allegations of a widespread
scheme, while refusing to apply it when only misrepresentations or omissions
under lOb-5(b) were alleged. Id. at 1163 n.16 (citing Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981), modified on other grounds, 650
F.2d 815 (5th Cir. July 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S.
375 (1983); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254, 259 (N.D. 11. 1981)). At
least one commentator has also suggested such a limit on the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory. See 4 H. NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONs 23 (2d ed. 1985) (assuming
theory to be applicable only to rule lOb-5(a) and (c) claims involving schemes).
82. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1162. Sklar involved the purchase of newly issued
revenue bonds of an industrial development board. 647 F.2d at 463-64. Speiser,
conversely, involved the purchase of a widely traded stock which traded in a
well-developed market. 806 F.2d at 1157. The Speiser court suggested that the
Sklar court believed it unlikely that a single misrepresentation or omission would
result in the sale of a new security. Id. at 1162-63. According to the court,
though, a well-developed market can reasonably be presumed to respond to
even a single material misrepresentation or omission concerning a stock already
being traded on the market. Id. at 1163.
83. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1163 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the
distinction between well-developed securities markets and markets for newly is-
sued securities, see infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 8.
85. See Note, supra note 4, at 1153-58; see also Black, supra note 7, at 472-73
("relaxed view" of reliance not appropriate in cases of less widely traded securi-
ties). The Speiser court suggested in dicta that the fraud-on-the-market theory,
resting on the analytical underpinnings of the efficient-market theory, may not
apply in the case of newly issued stock. 806 F.2d at 1161 n.10. Because the case
involved a widely traded and established stock, the court stated that it did not
have to consider whether it would apply the theory in other instances. Id. Thus,
the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory to fraud in connection with
newly issued securities remains an open question in the Third Circuit. See id.
In this discussion, the term "developed markets" generally refers to large,
impersonal, actively traded markets. See Note, supra note 4, at 1154. Such mar-
kets can be contrasted with "undeveloped markets," such as thin markets and
markets for new offerings and restricted resale securities. Id. at 1157.
One commentator has noted that two assumptions must be valid for the
fraud-on-the-market theory to apply-that securities prices reflect all available
public information and that they adjust rapidly to the dissemination of new fi-
nancial information. Note, supra note 2, at 647. It is suggested that this observa-
tion is consistent with the efficient-market hypothesis.
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Available empirical evidence suggests that developed markets are in-
deed efficient.8 6 Given the dearth of empirical studies of undeveloped
markets, 7 it is not clear whether the efficient-market hypothesis sup-
ports the extension of the fraud-on-the-market theory to less developed
markets.8 8 Common sense, though, suggests that prices of securities in
undeveloped markets, especially those for new offerings, do not fully
reflect all publicly available information in regard to those securities. 89
Thus, until more information is available regarding the valuation pro-
cess of securities in undeveloped markets, courts should restrict applica-
tion of the fraud-on-the-market theory of causation to efficient,
developed markets.90
Jeffrey E. Fleming
86. Note, supra note 4, at 1155 (citing R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 260-65 (1981); J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 96-97 (1973); W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 70-71
(2d ed. 1981)); Note, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Mar-
ket Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1977)); see also
J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 48 (4th ed. 1977); Fama,
Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55,
excerpted in R. POSNER & K. ScoTr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 156, 157-58 (1980).
A Texas district court has delivered one of the most in-depth analyses of the
efficient-market hypothesis. See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex.
1980) (certifying large class of buyers and sellers of securities of company that
restated its prior earnings). In describing the market valuation mechanism, that
court stated:
[T]he market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, trans-
mits information to the investor in the processed form of a market
price. Thus the market is performing a substantial part of the valuation
process performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The
market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that
given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth
the market price.
Id. at 143. The same court noted that the greater the accuracy and efficiency
with which market forces establish securities prices, the greater is the justifica-
tion for shifting to the defendant the burden of proving that his deception did
not affect those prices and that the plaintiff did not rely on market prices when
investing. See id. at 142.
87. Note, supra note 4, at 1157 (most empirical studies have been con-
ducted on well-developed markets). "Undeveloped" markets include those such
as new offerings, thin markets and restricted resale securities. Id.
88. Id. With new offerings, the underwriting process, rather than the mar-
ket itself, arguably acts as a means of valuation. Id. Thus, the price of a new
security does not reflect the other traders' reliance on the market, as it might do
in later trading. Id. & n.54.
89. Id. at 1157.
90. Id. at 1161. In urging that the fraud-on-the-market theory not be ex-
tended to inefficient markets, it is argued that in an efficient market, the theory
"logically adapts the tort model in order to take account of how market prices
may be distorted through the reliance of other traders." Id. The same cannot as
yet be said of the theory in inefficient markets. See id.; see also Black, supra note 7,
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at 473 (advocating that fraud-on-the-market theory only be applied to widely
traded securities).
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